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Because of large and rapid growing export volumes and its formal status as a non-market economy;
China has been the subject of large numbers of both antidumping initiations and measures. Current
estimates are that around 40% of such actions are against China; India, in turn, is the largest source
of initiation against China by number of actions. Here we explore the reactions of Chinese firms and
industries to these actions. No other papers to our knowledge explore these reactions empirically. We
use industrial panel data on all Chinese firms in the industry, foreign firms operating within China
and state owned enterprises (SOE) for aggregated firms group between 1997 and 2007. This provides
information on sales, profits, firm numbers, labor productivity, and employment. We are able to link
this data with a World Bank dataset on antidumping actions by industry by country (both by and against)
for the same period. We then use a dynamic system GMM estimator to explore the importance of different
forms of Chinese firms’ overall response to both initiations and measures. We also separately analyze
antidumping actions against China from developed and developing countries, US and EU to compare
their different effects. We find that antidumping actions by developed and developing countries negatively
impact industrial profits and employee and firm numbers and also exports. Output impacts are the
smallest. Labor productivity is improved by antidumping actions. We also find that different kinds
of firms show different responses. All firms together in an industry react to antidumping the most,
and foreign and SOE firms show a much smaller response. Also, developed countries’ antidumping
actions have more negative impact than developing countries’ actions for all firms and SOEs, but foreign
firms’ impacts are the opposite. Chinese industry reactions to antidumping actions by the US and EU
are the same as for other developed countries, but the effects of US actions are larger. US antidumping
actions have more impact than EU’s on firm numbers, employees and exports, and EU antidumping
has more influence than US on output, profit and labor productivity. Finally, comparing Chinese, foreign,
and SOE firm’s reactions to US and EU antidumping actions, our results show foreign firms to be
hurt more by antidumping from EU. We discuss policy implications in a concluding section.
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Abstract: Because of large and rapid growing export volumes and its formal status as a 
non-market economy; China has been the subject of large numbers of both antidumping 
initiations and measures. Current estimates are that around 40% of such actions are against 
China; India, in turn, is the largest source of initiation against China by number of actions. 
Here we explore the reactions of Chinese firms and industries to these actions. No other 
papers to our knowledge explore these reactions empirically. We use industrial panel data on 
all Chinese firms in the industry, foreign firms operating within China and state owned 
enterprises (SOE) for aggregated firms group between 1997 and 2007. This provides 
information on sales, profits, firm numbers, labor productivity, and employment. We are 
able to link this data with a World Bank dataset on antidumping actions by industry by 
country (both by and against) for the same period. We then use a dynamic system GMM 
estimator to explore the importance of different forms of Chinese firms’ overall response to 
both initiations and measures. We also separately analyze antidumping actions against 
China from developed and developing countries, US and EU to compare their different 
effects. We find that antidumping actions by developed and developing countries negatively 
impact industrial profits and employee and firm numbers and also exports. Output impacts 
are the smallest. Labor productivity is improved by antidumping actions. We also find that 
different kinds of firms show different responses. All firms together in an industry react to 
antidumping the most, and foreign and SOE firms show a much smaller response. Also, 
developed countries’ antidumping actions have more negative impact than developing 
countries’ actions for all firms and SOEs, but foreign firms’ impacts are the opposite. 
Chinese industry reactions to antidumping actions by the US and EU are the same as for 
other developed countries, but the effects of US actions are larger. US antidumping actions 
have more impact than EU’s on firm numbers, employees and exports, and EU antidumping 
has more influence than US on output, profit and labor productivity. Finally, comparing 
Chinese, foreign, and SOE firm’s reactions to US and EU antidumping actions, our results 
show foreign firms to be hurt more by antidumping from EU. We discuss policy implications 
in a concluding section.  
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 11. Introduction 
In this paper, we discuss firm and industry responses in China to 
antidumping (AD) initiations and measures. As China’s exports have grown, so 
along with them have trade actions against China through antidumping duties. 
In the last decades, China was the largest AD initiation and measure recipient 
country in the world. There are a lot of reasons why China is a prime target for 
those AD measures. One is China’s rapid export growth and the adjustment 
pressures these create in foreign markets. Another is China’s non-market 
economy (NME) status
1 in key countries (US and EU especially), relatively 
ineffective legal defenses, and the low concentration ratio in many Chinese 
industries which makes industry coordination to resist these measures more 
difficult. 
China's NME status is a reflection of its accession terms to the WTO. In 
2001, China agreed that it be treated as a NME for 15-years to 2016 (Chen, 
2009). As a result petitioners do not have to use Chinese domestic input prices in 
determining the cost of the production of an investigated product. This has been 
part of the reason for the growth in antidumping initiations against China since 
the low cost of labor is the major source of comparative advantage in trade for 
China. China’s non-market status also grants greater discretionary power to 
initiators which again increased the frequency of AD measures.  
When faced with an antidumping measure, a Chinese industry or the firm 
may react in various ways. These may include refocusing production on 
domestic markets, increased exports to other countries, or location abroad. 
Another is producing something else to avoid the foreign trade barriers. Fighting 
                                                        
1  There are 10 NMEs at present: China, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Mongolia. 
Russia was granted market status in 2000, while Vietnam's request for MES has been considered and rejected. 
 2the action and trying to solve the dispute by reaching agreement on a price 
undertaking is also an option. The final option is to close down production and 
exit the market. 
The reaction of Chinese firms and industries to these antidumping actions is 
now an important element in the policy debate in China as it affects what to do 
in response. If firms can easily adapt by producing different products and 
maintain profits and employment, active response seems less of an issue than if 
they are severely impacted. Therefore, analysis of the effects of antidumping 
actions on Chinese firms as industry groups is central to this debate.  
Specifically, we build all firm summed industry and other two kinds of firm 
summed (foreign firm and state-owned firm)
2 industrial division group panel 
data sets covering 39 industries from 1997 to 2007 for use in our analysis. We 
separate out AD actions into those undertaken by developed and developing 
countries, and also divide AD actions between the United States (US) and the 
European Union (EU). We exam their different effects on exports, output, profit, 
total firm number, total employee and industry labor productivity. The results 
allow us to assess both Chinese industries’ and firm groups’ reactions. Our 
regression method involves system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
In the next section we discuss Chinese AD experience and offer a brief 
literature review. Section 3 is data description and methodology. Section 4 
reports and discusses empirical results. The final section concludes and discusses 
policy implications.  
                                                        
2  It is important to also analyze private firm group reactions, but because of data availability, we can only obtain three years of this group 
data which are not enough for regression analysis, so their reactions can just be deduced indirectly.   
 32. Chinese Experience with AD and Prior Literature on the Impacts 
of AD 
According to the WTO antidumping database (WTO, 2010), China was the 
recipient of 19.75% of 3427 worldwide antidumping initiations and 21.87% of 
2190 antidumping measures globally between 1995 and 2008. In the last three 
years, 2006-2008, China was the recipient of 72, 61 and 73 AD initiations and 37, 
48, 52 AD measures respectively. These account for nearly 40% of the world 
totals (Fig. 1). Compared with China’s total exports, the export value of AD 
initiations and measures is not nearly as high since the product coverage of 
actions is usually narrowly focused. Per unit export coverage of AD measures in 
India and Korea are higher than in China (Fig. 2), but in the top ten AD 
measure receivers in the period 1995-2008 China ranks first (Table 1). China’s 
main AD initiator complaint countries are India, US, EU, Argentina, Turkey 
and Brazil (Table 2).  
[Fig. 1- Fig. 2 around Here] 
[Table 1- Table 2 around Here] 
A significant theoretical and empirical literature devotes exists on the 
impacts of AD measures, but does not discuss the Chinese case. Most papers 
focus on trade effects and reactions of AD by firms and industries, and find that 
AD have both trade depression and trade diversion effects. This literature 
includes Staiger and Wolack (1994), Prusa (2001), Ganguli (2005), Baylis et al 
(2009), Carter and Trant (2010). Some literature has also explored export or 
import countries’ reactions to AD in other dimensions; for example technological 
innovation, market power, and pricing etc (Crowley, 2006; Konings and 
Vandenbussche, 2005; Duc, 2010). 
 4 As heterogeneous firm trade theory has evolved in recent years, recent 
papers have also studied AD effects in this theoretical framework. These papers 
mainly analyze firms’ productivity response to AD protection, and include 
Konings and Vandenbussche (2008a), Konings and Vandenbussche (2008b) and 
Pierce (2009). There is also some literature analyzing AD effects in other ways. 
Brown (2005) uses a specific case study to examine the response of Korean steel 
firms after being assessed AD duties in the US. Francois (2009) sets up a global 
simulation model for analysis of tariffs and AD policy impacts on price, output, 
income and employment.  
Literature on China largely analyzes the reasons for AD and does not 
empirically analyze AD impacts on Chinese industry or firms. McGee and Yoon 
(1998) use five AD action cases initiated by US against China to assess 
development impacts. Messerlin (2004) analyzes both China’s antidumping 
recipient and user characteristics. Chu and Prusa (2004) study the reasons for 
and the impact of AD on China. Park (2009) studies Chinese trade diversion 
effects of AD actions. His results show that AD protection has both significant 
trade depression and trade diversion effects. Bown and Crowley (2010) analyze 
US and EU AD duties impacts on China’s export; findings that trade depression 
effects are weak and trade deflection effects are significant.  
 53. Methodology and Data 
In this paper we explicitly study China’s industry and firm group reactions 
to AD. We separately compare effects of AD from developed and developing 
countries on Chinese industries, and in addition separately analyze the US and 
the EU. We use system GMM methods to obtain results. 
3.1 Methodology 
We use panel data regression to analyze AD effects on Chinese industry and 
firm groups. Affirmative and negative measures have different effects. 
Additionally, AD can have lag effects. We use an estimation equation (1) where 
Yi,t denotes the dependent variable. 
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In our regressions we specifically consider industry exports, output, firm 
numbers, profits, and employee and labor productivity as endogenous variables. 
Yi,t-1 are one year lag effects of dependent variables. ADi,t-1 and AD1i,t-1 are 
separately one year lag terms of ADi,t and AD1i,t. In order to control for long 
term trend effects, we add a time trend variable in the equation. In dependent 
variables, labor productivity equals added value divided by numbers of 
employees. We use logarithmic values in our regressions to simplify the results 
and reduce heteroscedasticity. Table 3 summarizes these variables.  
[Table 3 around Here] 
We use a general-to-specific method to determine the lag length numbers for 
dependent and independent variables (Hendry and Clements, 2004)
3. Our data 
                                                        
3  For dynamic time series data, we can use an AIC and BIC rule to determine lag numbers. But there are no such rules for panel data. 
Here in the general-to-specific method developed by Hendry and Clements, the specific rule is first select a large lag order in the 
regression, if the coefficient is significant keep it, if not drop.   
 6embodies autocorrelation with one lag and so we include one lag in the 
right-hand side of our empirical specification. Because of lags in our dependent 
variable, we use dynamic panel methodology to estimate our equations. We 
deploy the Arellano-Bond instrumental variable procedure (Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) and which proposes a GMM estimator which 
accounts for within-panel autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity and estimates 
a dynamic panel specification similar to equation (1) above.  
The dynamic panel estimator first put forward by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
as a first order difference GMM produces estimates after taking first order 
differences in order to eliminate individual effects. Such methods however can 
induce sample partial bias (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Blundell and Bond (1998) 
propose a GMM-system estimator which not only first order differences but also 
uses lagged difference variables as instrumental variables to construct level 
equations. This method avoids endogeneity problems. This GMM estimator can 
be divided into one step and two step forms; the two step GMM method can give 
more robust results (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Windmeijer, 2005). Regressions 
in our paper are all two step system GMM results of this form.  
3.2 Data 
We use three data samples; an all firm summed industry sample, a foreign 
firm summed group sample, and a state-owned firm summed group sample. 
These data are firm summed within industries, and not firms by firm. Each 
sample yields observations of 39 industries from 1997 to 2007. Tables 4 and 5 
give the overall summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
in the empirical analysis. 
[Tables 4-5 around Here] 
 7Data on dependent variables except export values come from the Chinese 
Statistical Yearbook, and we use producer price indices as deflators. Export 
value data come from the Chinese Customs Statistical Yearbook. The AD data 
come from a World Bank global AD database (Bown, 2010). All of the 
dependent variables except export values are classified by Chinese “National 
Economy Industrial Classification” (NEIC) and have 39 2-digital manufacturing 
industries. The independent variables and export values are classified by the 
Harmonized System Codes Commodity Classification (HS). They cannot be 
directly merged together by industry. We take the NEIC as our benchmark; and 
allocate all of the AD cases into NEIC industries according to the detailed AD 
products as named one by one. We only have all firm summed industry data for 
export values. 
The global AD database (Bown, 2010) provides detailed AD case 
information by country division. Because our data are firm summed by industry, 
we cannot include AD duty variables in our regressions because most cases 
involve specific firms. Independent variables in our regressions are thus all 
dummies. Hence, if one or more firm in an industry received an AD investigation 
or measure in one year, we take that year’s AD investigation or measure variable 
to equal 1, otherwise it equals 0. 
 84. Empirical Results 
This section reports our empirical results. Since AD measures from 
developed and developing countries may have different effects, we first explore 
Chinese industry and firm group reactions with added discrimination among AD 
actions by developed and developing countries. Since the US and the EU are the 
two main trading partners of China, it is useful to also analyze and compare 
their separate AD effects.  
The global AD database (Bown, 2010) only has main countries’ AD 
information. We take the US and the EU to jointly denote developed countries 
(these two countries account for more than 25% of China’s total received AD 
initiations and measures (WTO, 2010)); and Argentina, India, Brazil, and 
Turkey as developing countries (these four countries account for about 40% of 
China’s total received AD initiations and measures (WTO, 2010)).  
    4.1 Impacts of AD from Developed and Developing Countries on Total 
Firm Numbers, Output, Employee, Profit, Labor Productivity and Exports 
Tables 6 to 7 report our estimation results. AD from both developed 
countries and developing countries adversely affect industry and firm groups’ 
output, employee, profit, firm numbers, and exports, but improve labor 
productivity. Comparatively, profits are hurt the most; the next are employees, 
firm numbers, and exports, and output is impacted the least. This suggests that 
when facing an AD measure, firms decrease their prices and profits, and then 
reduce employment to lower costs, but try to maintain exports and output. 
Different kinds of firms also show different kinds of response to AD measures. 
All firm summed industry react the most. Foreign and SOE firm groups show a 
small reaction. This suggests that AD mainly influences private firms. 
 9Developed countries’ AD have greater negative effects than developing 
countries’ on all firm summed industry and SOE firm groups. But the foreign 
firm group is impacted more by developing countries’ AD. This may because 
most foreign firms in China are from developed countries and they can avoid 
impacts easily by intra-firm trade adjustments.  
AD measures have generally significant effects on firm numbers. Also, 
variables related to one year before an investigation or the year of investigation 
and measure all have significant positive effects on all firms summed industry, 
and developed countries’ ADs have more influence. This suggests that firms 
enter the market and increase export before AD investigation and measures 
which directly induced other countries’ AD countermeasure. Variables of one 
year after measure, one year after if more than one investigation and interaction 
term of one year after if affirmative in developed countries and one year after if 
affirmative in developing countries also have significant negative effects using all 
firm summed industry data. The developed countries’ AD influence is more 
pronounced than for developing countries. Foreign firms and SOE firms response 
is less. Only variables of one year after if more than one investigation and the 
cross term of one year after if affirmative have negative effects. SOE firms show 
no significant influence for measures. In our data sample, all firms include SOE, 
foreign and private firms, so these results suggest that private firms responded 
more in firm numbers.  
For Chinese industrial output reaction, variables of one year after measure 
and interaction terms of one year after if affirmative and one year after if more 
than one investigation all have negative impacts on all firm industry output. 
Developed countries’ ADs again have more impact. Variables of year of 
 10investigation, measure and before measure in both developed and developing 
countries all have positive effects on all firm output. Foreign firm output has 
little reaction which may suggest that firms can easily circumvent AD barriers. 
SOE firm output shows little response; most of the reaction is by private firms. 
Since continuously increasing output may be one of the reasons for AD to China, 
these AD investigations and measures may exhibit simultaneity bias in our 
regressions. 
Chinese industrial employee reaction also shows significant coefficients only 
one year after an affirmative decision in developed countries and is significantly 
negative for all firm employees. This suggests that all firm employees only 
respond to developed countries’ affirmative AD measures. Variables of year of 
investigation in developing countries and one year before investigation in both 
developed and developing countries have positive relationships with all firm 
employees. One year after if affirmative and interaction term of one year after if 
more than one investigation in developed countries have large negative impacts 
on foreign firm employees. Also, variables of one year after if affirmative, one 
year after if more than one investigation from developing countries have negative 
impacts on foreign firm employees. Foreign firm employee numbers seem more 
sensitive to AD measures, which may because foreign firms are more flexible to 
change their workers. SOE firm employee numbers have little reaction to both 
developed and developing countries’ AD.  
Chinese industrial profit reactions suggest developed countries’ variables of 
year of investigation, year of measures, one year after measures and one year 
after if more than one investigation are all negatively related with all firm profits. 
Developing countries’ influences here are prominently weak. Developing 
 11countries’ variables of one year before and year of investigation and year of 
measure are all positively related to all firm profits. Total foreign firm profits are 
negatively influenced by AD measures from developing countries. Although AD 
measures have little impact on exports and output of foreign firms, they impact 
their profit significantly. AD has little impact on the profit of SOE firms.  
As for as Chinese industrial labor productivity reaction is concerned, 
developed countries’ AD investigations and measures have little effect on all firm 
industrial labor productivity, only the variable of one year before investigation is 
significantly positive. Developing countries’ AD variables are positively related 
with labor productivity with large coefficients. This suggests that AD threats 
have incentive effects on industrial labor productivity. Labor productivity 
improvement for foreign firm summation industry is more than for all firms. 
Foreign firms’ larger labor productivity improvement may reflect the larger 
negative impact on employees than on output. In contrast, SOE firms’ industrial 
labor productivity has virtually no response, but the variable of one year before 
investigation has a negative influence, perhaps because SOE firms find it harder 
to adjust employees in the short run when facing an AD threat.  
Finally comes Chinese industrial export reactions. We only have all firm 
summation industrial data on exports. Both developed and developing 
countries’ ADs have a negative influence on industrial exports, especially the 
variables of year of measure and one year after if affirmative. In general, 
developed countries’ AD has a greater negative influence on industrial exports 
than developing countries’.  
[Tables 6-7 around Here] 
    Generally, most of the estimation results imply that private firms react 
 12much more than foreign and SOE firms. One reason is that Chinese private firms 
are the main AD targets and most of the AD initiations and measures from 
abroad are aimed at private firms.  
4.2 Specific Impacts for AD from U.S. and EU 
There is a large difference in the impact of US and EU AD measures. Since 
US AD measures are aimed at specific firms, but EU AD measures are largely 
against whole industries, a difference in regime affects country results.  
Tables 8 to 9 report US and EU AD estimation results. AD from US and EU 
have a negative influence on industrial and firm groups’ firm numbers, output, 
employees, profits and exports but have positive effects on labor productivity. 
AD from US and EU have more impact than for developed and developing 
countries, because the US and EU are larger trade partners for China. US AD 
measures have more influence than EU’s on firm numbers, employees and 
exports; and EU AD measures have more influence than US’s on outputs, profits 
and labor productivity. AD from US and EU have little impact on foreign and 
SOE firm groups, the same as AD from developed and developing countries. 
Comparatively, foreign firms are affected more by AD from EU. This may be 
because EU AD has wider scope and foreign firms in China from the EU are 
relatively fewer.  
Both US and EU variables of year before investigation and measure have a 
positive influence on all firm numbers. Variables of one year after if more than 
one investigation from both US and EU and one year after measure from US 
have significant large negative coefficients, and US’s values are bigger than the 
EU, which mean that all firm numbers react significantly both to US and EU 
AD and especially to US. Foreign firm numbers have no significant relationship 
 13with US AD but are significantly related with EU measures. SOE firm numbers 
have actually no significant relationship with both US and EU AD. Overall, all 
firm numbers react significantly to both US and EU AD, but foreign and SOE 
firm numbers react only a little, most of the reaction is by private firms. 
Industrial output reacts only a little to both US and EU AD investigations 
and measures, and EU effects are more. Foreign firm output shows little reaction 
to AD from US and EU. Both countries’ AD measures have negative impacts on 
SOE firm output, and also EU effects are larger. 
AD from US has significant influence on all firm industrial employees, but 
AD from EU has little negative impact. Foreign firm employees respond 
negatively to AD from both US and EU, and US effects are greater. Generally, 
foreign firm reactions for employees are smaller than for all firms. SOE firm 
employees react little. These results also show that US variable of one year after 
if more than one investigation from both countries has negative influence to SOE 
firm employees, and also US effect is more intensive. US AD measures seem to 
have more employee effects than EU.  
The variable of one year after if more than one investigation from both 
countries has significant negative impacts on all firm profits, and EU’s influence 
is much larger. AD from US has little influence on foreign firm profits. But EU’s 
AD has significant negative impact on foreign firm profits. This may be because 
the EU is an important export partner for foreign firms. SOE firms’ profits show 
little reaction to AD from both countries.  
AD from both US and EU have labor productivity incentive effects. 
Variables of one year after measures and one year after if more than one 
investigation from US and EU separately have positive effects on all firm labor 
 14productivity, and overall EU effects are bigger than US. Foreign and SOE firm 
labor productivity show no significant response to AD from both countries.  
AD from both US and EU have significantly impacts on industrial exports, 
and US have more influence. Overall, AD measure impacts on exports are small.   
[Tables 8-9 around Here] 
    4.3 Robustness Checks of Results 
Our empirical model contains lag terms for dependent variable, and hence 
endogeneity is a potential problem. Our system GMM method can partly 
overcome these endogeneity problems. We use two methods to test the validity 
of the parameter estimates. The first is the Sargan over-identification test to 
assess the validity of instrumental variables. If this cannot reject the null 
hypothesis, it suggests that the instrumental variable is appropriate. The second 
is using an AR(2) test to check for residual non-autocorrelation, that is testing 
the existence of second-order residual autocorrelation.  
In the empirical results presented in Tables 6-9, all of the P values for AR(2) 
test are bigger than 0.15, so there would seem to be no residual autocorrelation 
problem for the estimation. All of the P values for the Sargan over identification 
test reveal that instrumental variable selections are appropriate.  
In order to further check the robustness of our estimation results we 
separate AD from developed and developing countries and AD from US and EU 
to estimate results individually. After comparing the mixed and separate 
regression results
4, we find that AD effects from developed and developing 
countries, and from US and EU are all the same in both forms of estimation. 
These feasibility checks suggest that the estimates presented earlier are robust.  
                                                        
4  Mixed estimation results are presented in the Tables 6 to 9. Separate estimation results for robustness checks are 
omitted in the paper because of the limitation of paper length. Readers interested in these results can contact the 
authors. 
 155. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In conclusion, our analysis suggests that AD investigations and measures 
have significant impact on Chinese industries and firm groups. AD from 
developed and developing countries including US and EU all reduce firm 
numbers, output, employee, profit and export, but improve labor productivity. 
Comparatively, developed countries’ AD have more severe impacts than 
developing countries except for the foreign firm group; and all firm summed 
industry react the most. Foreign and SOE firm groups just have a little response. 
 If we take the US and EU as specific country cases, we find that their 
measures have larger impact than those of other developed and developing 
countries. Also, US AD measures have more impact on firm numbers, employees 
and exports; and EU AD measures have more impact on outputs, profits and 
labor productivity. In addition, AD from both countries have only a small 
impact on foreign and SOE firm groups. Foreign firm group are relatively 
affected more by AD from EU. 
From these findings, we can assess overall Chinese industrial and firm 
groups’ reactions to AD. They suggest that some Chinese firms have closed 
down and exited the market under the pressure of AD. When we compare the 
reaction of output and export, we can see that relocation may be happening 
since industrial output reacts much more than exports. Firms may also choose to 
sell more in domestic or export to other countries to avoid the impacts of AD. 
There is no information to indicate whether producing something else has the 
reaction, and also we have no data on whether firing against action. 
Our results also suggest that Chinese industry and private firm group have 
been significantly hurt by AD, but exports are comparatively less affected which 
 16may imply trade diversion. From these results, Chinese industry and firms 
seemingly might not need to care too much about AD from abroad, but firm 
profit and return plus employee have been significantly affected by them, which 
means firms have tried to maintain their exports by reducing costs and prices, so 
that their trade conditions have deteriorated.  
We also show that SOE and foreign firm groups have been less impacted by 
AD measures and most of the reactions are by private Chinese firms for they are 
the main ones targeted. Also Chinese firm groups respond little to AD from 
developing countries. These results suggest that only main trade partners’ AD 
measures significantly influence Chinese industry and firms. Thus in guarding 
AD response China should perhaps emphasize and pay more attention to main 
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Fig. 1 China’s AD Initiations and Measures, 1995-2008   














Fig. 2 AD Measures by Export Value over The Period 1995-2008 
Unit: Cases per Billions of US Dollar 
Sources: AD measures data get from WTO antidumping database; Export value data from United Nations 


















 18Table 1 Top 10 Global AD Initiation and Measure Recipient Countries over The Period 1995-2008 
Initiations Measures 
Rank 
Country Amount Share  % Country Amount Share  % 
1 China  677  19.75  China  677  19.75 
2 Korea  252 7.35  Korea  252 7.35 
3  United States  189  5.52  United States 189  5.52 
4  Chinese Taipei  187  5.46  Chinese Taipei 187  5.46 
5  Indonesia 145  4.23 Indonesia 145  4.23 
  6  Japan 144  4.20 Japan 144  4.20 
7  Thailand 142  4.14 Thailand 142  4.14 
8  India 137 4.00  India 137 4.00 
9  Russia 109  3.18 Russia 109  3.18 
10 Brazil 97  2.83  Brazil 97  2.83 
Source: WTO antidumping database.   
 




Chinese Share in 
Total (%) 
Amount 
Chinese Share in 
Total (%) 
India 120  17.73  90  18.11 
United  States  87 12.85 66 13.28 
European  Community  84 12.41 60 12.07 
Argentina  61 9.01 40 8.05 
Turkey  51 7.53 48 9.66 
Brazil  37 5.47 21 4.23 
South  Africa  30 4.43 16 3.22 
Australia  28 4.14 12 2.41 
Mexico  25 3.69 15 3.02 
Korea  23 3.40 18 3.62 
Canada  22 3.25 15 3.02 
Columbia 21  3.10  11  2.21 
Peru  18 2.66 15 3.02 
Egypt 13  1.92  11  2.21 
Indonesia  9 1.33 5 1.01 
Venezuela 9  1.33  11  2.21 
others  39 5.76 43 8.65 
All  677 100 497 100 









 19Table 3 Description of Regression Variables 
Variable 
Type 
Variables  Abbreviate Description  Source of Data 
Export EX 
Total export of a 
industry in a year 
Chinese Customs Statistic 
Yearbook 1997-2008 
Output Output 
Total output of a 
industry in a year 
Chinese Statistic Yearbook 
1997-2008 
Firm Numbers  Firm_no 
Total firm numbers of a 
industry in a year 
Chinese Statistic Yearbook 
1997-2008 
Profit   Profit 
Total profit of a industry 
in a year 
Chinese Statistic Yearbook 
1997-2008 
Employee   Employee
Total employee of a 
industry in a year 





Labor  Productivity   LP  
Labor productivity of a 
industry in a year 
Chinese Statistic Yearbook 
1997-2008 
Year of investigation  AD  AD investigation year  Global AD Database 2010
1 Year after measures  AD1 
One year later of AD 
measures 
Global AD Database 2010
1 year after if 
affirmative 
AD2 
Affirmative AD 1 year 
after measures 
Global AD Database 2010
1 year after if negative  AD3 
Negative AD 1 year 
after measures 




1 year after if more 
than one investigation 
AD4 
Receive More than 1 
investigation 
Global AD Database 2010
Source: Compiled by the authors.   
 
Table 4 Overall Summary Statistics For Dependent Variables 
Variable  Unit  Obs. Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
All Firm Summation Sample          
Export value  RMB100M 419  1.23E+07 1.91E+07 3.02E+05 1.24E+08
Output  RMB100M 380  4236.67 5721.39  5.20   39223.77 
Firm number  Entries  419  6245.85 6385.44  13    58662 
Employee  10 Thousand 419  144.21 129.18  0.08   626.26 
Profit  RMB100M 380  262.35 447.77 -312.24    3652.12 
Ln(lp)  100M/Person 419  5.79   2.51   -7.25   10.55 
Foreign Firm Summation Sample          
Export value  RMB100M 0      
Output  RMB100M 337  1383.65 3040.62  0.01   32966.71 
Firm number  Entries  375  1133.57  1229.53  1   6047  
Employee  10 Thousand 193  47.02 64.41  0.01    442.72 
Profit  RMB100M 336  84.91 142.91 -1.94 1114.47 
Ln(lp)  100M/Person 193  2.81   4.02   -13.46  9.97  
SOE Firm Summation Sample          
Export value  RMB100M 0      
Output  RMB100M 343  1591.52 2816.04  0.14   24025.61 
Firm number  Entries  382  1083.47  1196.93  1   8057  
Employee  10 Thousand 195  49.40 65.78  0.01    335.30 
Profit  RMB100M 342  126.95 382.13 -417.89    3642.23 






Table 5 Overall Summary Statistics For the Independent Variables 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
AD from Developed Countries       
Year of AD Investigation  419  0.1838 0.3878  0 1 
1 Year After if Affirmative  419  0.1098 0.3130  0 1 
1 Year After if Negative  419  0.0621 0.2415  0 1 
1 Year After if More than One Investigation 419  0.0501 0.2185  0 1 
1 Year After AD Measure  419  0.1742 0.3798  0 1 
AD from Developing Countries       
Year of AD Investigation  419  0.2148 0.4112  0 1 
1 Year After if Affirmative  419  0.1146 0.3189  0 1 
1 Year After if Negative  419  0.0692 0.2541  0 1 
1 Year After if More than One Investigation 419  0.0549 0.2280  0 1 
1 Year After AD Measure  419  0.1814 0.3858  0 1 
AD from US       
Year of AD Investigation  419  0.1098 0.3130  0 1 
1 Year After if Affirmative  419  0.0931 0.2909  0 1 
1 Year After if Negative  419  0.0167 0.1283  0 1 
1 Year After if More than One Investigation 419  0.0191 0.1370  0 1 
1 Year After AD Measure  419  0.1026 0.3038  0 1 
AD from EU       
Year of AD Investigation  419  0.1026 0.3038  0 1 
1 Year After if Affirmative  419  0.0644 0.2458  0 1 
1 Year After if Negative  419  0.0215 0.1452  0 1 
1 Year After if More than One Investigation 419  0.0191 0.1370  0 1 
1 Year After AD Measure  419  0.0859 0.2806  0 1 
 Table 6 Effects of Developed and Developing Countries’ AD Measures on Chinese Industry I (GMM- System Regression) 
Firm Number    Industry Output    Industry Employee   
Dependent Variable: ln (Y) 
All Firm  Foreign Firm SOE Firm  All Firm  Foreign Firm SOE Firm  All Firm  Foreign Firm SOE Firm 
ln (Y) (-1)  0.660*** 0.973*** 1.020*** 0.717*** 0.942*** 1.042*** 0.893*** 0.900*** 1.005*** 
AD from Developed Countries            
1 year before investigation  0.243***  0.0151  -0.0322** 0.139**  0.0175 -0.0218  0.0947*  -0.135 -0.0124 
Year of investigation  0.305***  0.0178 -0.0234  0.118**  0.0505 0.00442 0.0562  -0.163  0.0462 
Year of measures  0.230***  0.0181 -0.00803  0.153***  -0.00583  -0.0672**  0.0112 -0.0608 -0.0269 
1 year after if affirmative     0.00764  0.174  1.868  2.951  -0.402* -1.329*  0.194 
1 year after if negative  0.918***  0.0992 0.0414 0.0560 -1.819 -2.427 -0.118 2.827*  -0.0205 
1 year after if more than one investigation  -0.0164** -0.137*  -0.0466  -0.0743*  0.0618  -0.153***  0.0361 0.417 -0.0140 
1 year after measures  -0.212*  -0.243 -0.0520  -0.150**  -1.902 -2.988 -0.350 -1.332 -0.252 
1 year after measures*1 year after if affirmative -0.00541* -0.281*         
1 year after measures*1 year after if negative  -0.944 0.170  -0.0147  0.169 3.740 5.406 0.434  4.331*  0.134 
1 year after measures* after if more than ones -0.0234 0.0719  0.0830  0.114  -0.0382 -0.179 -0.0574  -0.438** -0.162* 
AD from Developing Countries           
1 year before investigation  0.178***  0.0255 -0.00419  0.0623**  -0.0180 0.0292 0.0757*  -0.00165 -0.0974 
Year of investigation  0.205***  0.00998 -0.0143 0.0836*  0.00524  0.0674** 0.119***  -0.0118 -0.0386 
Year of measures  0.0793* -0.0368* -0.00848 0.0434  0.0227 -0.00808 -0.0234 -0.0202 -0.0582* 
1 year after if affirmative  -0.235***  -0.0419 0.000163 0.0296  0.0262  -0.125  0.0268  -0.178**  -0.0158 
1 year after if negative  0.299***  -0.0156  0.0561*  -0.111 0.0505 0.0392 -0.139 0.0714   
1 year after if more than one investigation  0.400  -0.282*  -0.374 0.297 -2.158 -3.149 -0.684  -1.548*  0.0947 
1 year after measures  0.162**  0.0113 -0.0101  -0.128**  0.0559  -0.129** 0.0660*  -0.0788 -0.00730 
1 year after measures*1 year after if affirmative -0.199*  0.0444  -0.0436* -0.0512*  -0.0792 0.202 0.0881  -0.176*  -0.0286 
1 year after measures*1 year after if negative  0.334***  0.0514 -0.0850 0.0594 0.0119 0.0124  0.191    -0.0859 
1 year after measures* after if more than ones  -0.366  -0.322*  0.372 -0.401 2.178 3.160 0.734 1.608  -0.0451 
Time  0.0540*** 0.0204*** 0.00111  0.0607*** 0.0339*** 0.0230*  0.0292*** 0.0372*  0.0149 
Cons.  -105.7*** -40.67***  -2.437  -120.8***  -67.75*** -46.02* -58.00*** -74.11*  -29.81 
Obs.  378 296 304 300 220 226 378 154 156 
AR(2)-P value  0.9981  0.5618  0.4587  0.8832 0.4251  0.968  0.2713 0.2385 0.3035 
Sargan test-P value  0.1621 0.1721 0.1849 0.1880 0.3218 0.3575 0.2747 0.1647 0.1910 
Note: *, **, *** denote significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
 
  22Table 7 Effects of Developed and Developing Country AD Measures on Chinese Industry II (GMM- System Regression) 
Industry Profit  Labor Productivity  Industry Export 
Dependent Variable: ln (Y) 
All Firm  Foreign Firm SOE Firm  All Firm  Foreign Firm SOE Firm  All Firm 
ln (Y) (-1)  0.870*** 0.647*** 0.669*** 0.682*** 0.797*** 0.695***  0.720*** 
AD from Developed Countries          
1 year before investigation  -0.0648  -0.0283  0.117  0.373*** 1.024**  0.205 0.0221 
Year of investigation  -0.0992*  -0.0491  0.133 0.212 0.639 -0.505  0.0332 
Year of measures  -0.184*** -0.124*  -0.114 0.202 0.432 -0.550  -0.110* 
1 year after if affirmative  -0.0890  -0.276    0.447  -3.659  0.248  -0.130* 
1 year after if negative  1.211  -0.143  2.555  -0.307  3.837*  0.771 -0.127 
1 year after if more than one investigation  -1.110*  0.415*  0.131 0.292 0.108 -0.567  0.0161 
1 year after measures  -0.0134*  0.141 0.330 -0.690 3.020 -1.375  0.167 
1 year after measures*1 year after if affirmative      -0.447         
1 year after measures*1 year after if  negative  -1.327 -0.118 -3.233 0.793 7.702*  -0.510  
1 year after measures* after if more than ones  0.962  -0.401**  -0.0708 0.758  -1.654** 1.897***   
AD from Developing Countries          
1 year before investigation  0.0924*  0.103 0.113  0.243*  -0.382  -0.670*  0.0727 
Year of investigation  0.0788* 0.266***  0.0200  0.355***  0.215 0.138  0.00770 
Year of measures  0.0900** 0.153***  0.0642  0.391***  0.0841 0.244  -0.0615*** 
1 year after if affirmative  -0.0615  -0.0246  0.0926  -0.0838  0.307  0.226  -0.00751** 
1 year after if negative  0.0774  -0.543  -0.0159  -0.247  -0.829    -0.406 
1 year after if more than one investigation  -0.00451  0.839  0.721  2.716  11.93**  0.569 0.240 
1 year after measures  -0.0515  -0.481  0.657** 0.557***  1.116  1.131*  0.0336 
1 year after measures*1 year after if affirmative  -0.197* -0.616** -0.612*  0.123 -0.701 -0.481  -0.0538 
1 year after measures*1 year after if negative  -0.0211  1.088  -0.291  0.307    -0.780  0.314 
1 year after measures* after if more than ones  -0.0901*  -0.887 -1.050 -3.324 -12.69 -1.710   
Time  0.0178*** 0.0865***  0.0417  0.0907*** -0.203*** -0.232***  0.0636* 
Cons.  -35.32*** -173.8***  -83.97  -180.2*** 406.8*** 466.8***  -124.5* 
Obs.  323 291 255 378 154 156  184 
AR(2)-P value  0.7771  0.4859  0.1755 0.2125 0.1829 0.9429  0.5205 
Sargan test-P value  0.6879 0.7297 0.2702 0.1251 0.1628 0.1703  0.9864 
Note: *, **, *** denote significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
 
  23Table 8 Effects of US and EU AD Measures on Chinese Industry I (GMM- System Regression) 
Firm Number  Industry Output  Industry Employee  Dependent Variable: ln (Y) 
All Firm  Foreign Firm SOE Firm  All Firm  Foreign Firm SOE Firm  All Firm  Foreign Firm SOE Firm 
ln (Y) (-1)  0.655*** 0.974*** 1.018*** 0.747*** 0.955*** 1.035*** 0.904*** 0.849*** 0.993*** 
AD from US           
1 year before investigation  0.207***  0.0115  -0.0412*** 0.0817 0.00159 0.0230 0.0583*  0.0626 -0.0257 
Year of investigation  0.338***  0.0360 -0.0268  0.125**  0.0508  0.0583** 0.136***  0.0432 0.000706 
Year of measures  0.251***  0.0149  -0.0314** 0.116**  -0.0681*  -0.0115  0.0817* 0.141*  0.0183 
1 year after if affirmative  -0.405 -0.113    -0.0279*  -0.0590  -0.233*** -0.184*   0.219 
1 year after if negative  -0.260  -0.128  -0.0332 -0.00829 -0.0571  0.0775*** 0.255***  -0.261 0.0337 
1 year after if more than one investigation  -0.133*  0.00513 -0.0363 0.00814  -0.00873 -0.0302  -0.194*** -0.162*  -0.0334* 
1 year after measures  -0.602*  0.143 -0.0218 0.121 0.0546  -0.204*** -0.250**  0.0932 -0.215 
1 year after measures*1 year after if affirmative          
1 year after measures*1 year after if negative     0.0278       0.125   
1 year after measures* after if more than ones           
AD from EU           
1 year before investigation  0.250*** 0.0925*** 0.0145  0.133*** 0.109**  0.0256  0.178*** 0.108*  0.0227 
Year of investigation  0.288***  0.0135 0.0138  0.00919  0.0799**  0.0276  0.0642*  0.0156 -0.0602 
Year of measures  0.249*** 0.0516**  0.0128 0.0589 0.0525 0.0109 0.0352  0.0976*  0.00933 
1 year after if affirmative  -0.577  -0.157**  0.0417  -0.328*  0.184  -0.224***  0.0363  -0.0355*  0.0167 
1 year after if negative  -0.660  0.210***  0.0665 -0.301  0.131  0.263***  -0.0352 0.170 -0.0341 
1 year after if more than one investigation  -0.101*  -0.0471 -0.0130 -0.0269 -0.0518 0.0455 -0.0486 -0.201* -0.00662* 
1 year after measures  0.725  -0.168***  -0.0357 0.303  -0.132  -0.257***  -0.0742 0.00596 -0.0434 
1 year after measures*1 year after if affirmative          
1 year after measures*1 year after if negative           
1 year after measures* after if more than ones           
Time  0.0626*** 0.0175*** -0.00313* 0.0549*** 0.0411***  0.0199*  0.0277*** 0.0144  0.0131* 
cons  -122.8***  -34.77*** 6.033* -109.3***  -82.17*** -39.79* -55.18***  -28.36  -26.42* 
Obs.  378 296 304 300 220 226 378 154 156 
AR(2)-P  value  0.8323 0.4517 0.4494 0.3938 0.4806 0.8667 0.5501 0.2224 0.3111 
Sargan test-P value  0.1163 0.1652 0.1783 0.1759 0.1783 0.2171 0.1027 0.1612 0.1551 
Note: *, **, *** denote significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
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Table 9 Effects of US and EU AD Measures on Chinese Industry II (GMM- System Regression) 
Industry Profit  Labor Productivity  Industry Export  Dependent Variable: ln (Y) 
All Firm  Foreign Firm SOE Firm  All Firm  Foreign Firm SOE Firm  All Firm 
Ln (Y) (-1)  0.849*** 0.653*** 0.580*** 0.725*** 0.820*** 0.669***  1.030*** 
AD from US          
1 year before investigation  -0.0989***  -0.0835  0.152* 0.242*** 0.915*  0.877*  0.0852** 
Year of investigation  -0.00405  -0.135*  0.199  0.503***  0.676 0.531  0.107* 
Year of measures  0.0380 -0.0350 -0.0362  0.538***  0.732 0.860  0.0202 
1 year after if affirmative   0.154  -0.429  1.235   
1 year after if negative  0.181 0.0697  0.799*** -0.414*  0.0326 0.445  -0.264 
1 year after if more than one investigation  -0.0626*  -0.157 0.0385  0.616***  0.233 0.161  0.0208 
1 year after measures  0.00858 -0.130  0.0934 0.774*  -0.219 -1.240  -0.0628* 
1 year after measures*1 year after if affirmative  -0.313**    -1.060***   0.556   -0.338* 
1 year after measures*1 year after if negative          
1 year after measures* after if more than ones          
AD from EU          
1 year before investigation  0.141***  -0.0808 0.0479 0.287**  -0.734  -0.842*  0.0359 
Year of investigation  0.199***  -0.0853 0.154 0.273*  0.124 -0.465  -0.0434 
Year of measures  0.0316 -0.0771  0.211  0.111  -0.0965 -0.462  0.0491 
1 year after if affirmative  -0.446  -0.407*  0.0826  -1.396**  -1.478 -1.437  -0.0928 
1 year after if negative  -0.542  0.509*  -0.0601 -1.501 -2.269*  -2.477  
1 year after if more than one investigation  -0.163***  0.0589 0.0920  0.370***  0.916 0.553  -0.0424* 
1 year after measures  0.398  -0.635**  0.123  1.278*  2.072 1.694  -0.0460* 
1 year after measures*1 year after if affirmative          
1 year after measures*1 year after if negative          
1 year after measures* after if more than ones          
Time  0.0203*** 0.0944*** 0.0883*** 0.0854*** -0.135*** -0.244***  0.00854 
cons  -40.44*** -189.4*** -177.5*** -169.5*** 272.3***  491.2***  -17.26 
Obs.  323 291 255 378 154 156  184 
AR(2)-P value  0.7961  0.4295  0.2196 0.1991 0.5360 0.8016  0.3393 
Sargan test-P value  0.1689 0.3738 0.1431 0.1625 0.1501 0.1523  0.4356 
Note: *, **, *** denote significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. 
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